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. STATEMENT OF-THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Troy Dwayne Payne appeals from the district court's order dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In its decision on Payne's underlying criminal case, State v. Payne, Docket No.
38918, 2012 Unpublished Op. No. 573 (Idaho App., August 2, 2012), the Court of
Appeals offered the following factual background for this case:
On April 6, 2009, without any prior notice, Payne went to the home
of a law enforcement officer and handed the officer a small container filled
with methamphetamine. According to Payne's subsequent trial testimony,
the officer agreed to allow him to turn in the methamphetamine "without
repercussions" and "with no strings attached." However, the officer
testified that he told Payne only that the officer would not pursue charges
if Payne entered drug rehabilitation treatment and provided information to
the police, presumably regarding the source of the drugs. Payne refused
to cooperate with the police, however, and was eventually charged with
possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), for possessing
the methamphetamine that he gave to the officer.
Shortly after the jury was empaneled, the State notified the court
that it anticipated that Payne would testify regarding his motive for
possessing methamphetamine, and the State orally moved to preclude
such testimony on grounds of irrelevance. Defense counsel confirmed
that Payne planned to present a defense that he did not intend to possess
the methamphetamine. Defense counsel said that Payne would testify
about his motive and intent in order to demonstrate that he possessed the
methamphetamine for the sole purpose of delivering it to the police. The
district court repeatedly declined to rule on the State's motion regarding
the admissibility of such testimony, preferring to wait until Payne testified.
Payne ultimately was allowed to testify that an acquaintance tossed the
container into his car, and that in an effort to "do the right thing" he took it
to the police as soon as he realized that it contained drugs. The jury
returned a guilty verdict and Payne appeal[ed], contending that the district
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court erroneously prevented him from presenting a defense that he lacked
the requisite intent for the offense.

kL

pp.1-2. The Court of Appeals upherd Payne's conviction finding that he was, in fact,

able to present his proffered defense.

lsL pp.6-7.

On August 22, 2013, Payne filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, in
which he alleged that his trial attorney had been ineffective for failing to (1) raise
affirmative defenses of (a) innocent and/or temporary possession or (b) misfortune and
(2) request jury instructions on those defenses; or in the alternative that appellate
counsel had been ineffective for failing to argue that the jury should have been
instructed on innocent and/or temporary possession.
included an affidavit from one of the jurors from his trial.

(R., pp.4-14.)

Payne also

(R., pp.16-18.) The state

moved to strike the affidavit as inadmissible evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence
606(b). (R., pp.147-48.) Payne objected to the motion but conceded that "enumerated
statements 3, 7, and 8 are inadmissible" under Rule 606(b). (R., pp.150-53.)
The state then filed a motion for summary dismissal arguing that (1) Payne had
failed to raise a material issue of fact showing that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to raise an affirmative defense that had not been recognized in Idaho; (2) appellate
counsel also was not ineffective for failing to present the unrecognized defense; and (3)
Payne had failed to raise a material issue of fact showing that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise the affirmative defense of "misfortune" because it did not
apply to drug possession and Payne was not prejudiced regardless.

(R., pp.164-76,

196-204.) The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal.
pp.205-14.) Payne filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.216-18.)

2

(R.,

ISSUE
Payne's statement of the issues on appeal is found at page 8 of his Appellant's
brief and is lengthy. The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Payne failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Payne Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Summarily Dismissing
His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
In his post-conviction petition, Payne asserted that he was entitled to relief

because, he claimed, his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to
"present the affirmative defense of 'innocent possession' or 'temporary possession"' and
request a jury instruction on the same; and (2) "failing to raise and request jury
instructions for the affirmative defense of 'misfortune or accident' pursuant to I.C. § 18201 (3)." (R., pp.6-8.) Payne also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective.
(R., p.8.) The district court summarily dismissed Payne's petition. (R., pp.205-12.) On
appeal, Payne argues that the district court erred by dismissing his post-conviction
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-17.) However,
application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows that summary
dismissal was appropriate.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

4

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Payne's Post-Conviction Petition
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a

new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P .3d at 802;
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

Generally, the

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v.
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).

However, unlike other civil

complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P.
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth
the grounds upon which the application is based."

kl

(citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The

application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548,561,199 P.3d 123,136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief on the trial court's own initiative or in response to a party's motion. "To
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278,
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a
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claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v.

State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts,
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.

kl (citing Stuart v.

State, 118 Idaho

865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

kl

Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption
that counsel's performance was adequate and "show that his attorney's conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154,
177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (citations omitted). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be
second-guessed

on

appeal

unless those decisions are based

on

inadequate

preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
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evaluation."

kl

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show "a reasonable

probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome
proceeding would have been different."

the

kl

Articulating and applying relevant legal standards, the district court addressed
and properly dismissed Payne's ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he
failed to present admissible evidence establishing a prima facie case supporting them.
(R., pp.205-12.) Payne failed to present sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case
of deficient performance regarding his attorney not presenting the defense or requesting
an instruction on innocent possession, which has never been recognized in Idaho. (R.,
pp.210-11.) Payne failed to present sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of
either deficient performance or prejudice in his attorney's not presenting the defense of
misfortune or accident. (R., pp.211-12.)
On appeal, Payne represents that the district court dismissed his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that "the propriety of jury instructions is
not ordinarily a matter that can be asserted in post-conviction."

(Appellant's brief,

pp.10-11, 16.) Payne appears to misunderstand the district court's order. The issue
was whether Payne had presented evidence showing that his defense counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard, an issue the district court squarely
decided.

(See R., pp.210-12.)

Payne wanted the court to presume deficient

performance based only on defense counsel not requesting certain jury instructions.
(Id.) The district court would not presume deficient performance, especially where the
propriety of the jury instructions needed to be raised on direct appeal. (Id.) Reviewing
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Court of Appeals' decision, the district court could not find that either proposed jury
instruction should have been given. (Id.)
Defense counsel's alleged failure to present the affirmative defense of "innocent
possession" or to request a jury instruction on the same cannot raise even a prima facie
case of objectively deficient performance because that affirmative defense has never
been recognized in Idaho. "Although the failure to advance an established legal theory
may result in ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the failure to advance a
novel theory will not." Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91, 190 P.3d 905, 910 (Ct App.
2008); see also Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010).
Having failed to show that defense counsel was deficient for failing to present a novel
defense, Payne failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel on this claim.
Though the defense of misfortune or accident is an "established legal theory" in
Idaho, that alone is insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel.

Even

assuming, arguendo, that the defense of misfortune would apply to the facts of Payne's
criminal proceeding below and defense counsel should have requested a jury
instruction on that defense, Payne still failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel because he failed to present any admissible evidence of
prejudice. On appeal, Payne relies on an affidavit submitted by one of the jurors from
his trial, Ms. Junger; specifically her statement that she may have voted to acquit Payne
had there been an affirmative defense instruction.
But this statement was inadmissible.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides:
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(See Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.)

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes
in connection therewith, nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a juror may
testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may be questioned
about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or not the jury
determined any issue by resort to chance.
I.R.E. 606(b) (emphasis added). Payne conceded below that "enumerated statements
3, 7, and 8," the only statements with any relevance to Payne's prejudice argument on
appeal, were "inadmissible because they address matters and statements made during
the course of juror deliberations." (R., pp.151-52 (emphasis original).)

If the district

court considered any of those statements from the Junger affidavit, it did so erroneously
under Rule 606(b). Were this Court to consider any of those inadmissible statements
on appeal, it would also do so in error.
In the absence of the concededly inadmissible statements from the Junger
affidavit, Payne has failed to present evidence raising even a prima facie case that he
was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to request an instruction on misfortune.
Having failed to present admissible evidence of prejudice, Payne failed to make a prima

facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim.
Because Payne failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel on either theory, the district court correctly dismissed his petition for postconviction relief. The district court's order should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm

district

order

summarily dismissing Payne's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 27th day of October, 2015.
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~-Scc..-P_E_N_C_E_R_ _ __
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of October, 2015, served two true
and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing the copies in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP
P. 0. Box 2772
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